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General Software Discussion / Is Whole Disk Encryption Just Wishful Thinking?
« Last post by 40hz on July 20, 2008, 04:32 PM »A little while ago, there was quite a bit of discussion in the TrueCrypt 6.0 thread on the issue of encrypted drives. I've always been a big promoter of encrypted file systems. I never thought they were completely bulletproof (since nothing ever is) but I just read an article over at ghacks that has got me wondering if they're really worth the trouble at all:
Software to defeat Disk Encryption released
www.ghacks.net/2008/07/20/software-to-defeat-disk-encryption-released
Looks like some researchers over at Princeton U have a workable crack for several disk encryption techniques. They have published their study (available for download), along with the tools they used to pull it off.
Here's the abstract from the Princeton website: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory
Very interesting. And very sobering! Can't wait to try this one out at home...
Software to defeat Disk Encryption released
www.ghacks.net/2008/07/20/software-to-defeat-disk-encryption-released
Looks like some researchers over at Princeton U have a workable crack for several disk encryption techniques. They have published their study (available for download), along with the tools they used to pull it off.
Here's the abstract from the Princeton website: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory
Abstract
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
Very interesting. And very sobering! Can't wait to try this one out at home...

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But I think it's safer not to allow Carl and 40hz to post on that thread, or they might teach bad examples!