Is DNSCrypt abandonware? The Windows client hasn't been updated in two years. . .
I wondered the same, but came to the conclusion that it would not be correct to call it abandonware, as it has not been abandoned - it just doesn't require any further development at this stage. Quickly putting it into the Public Domain after it had achieved final version was probably a calculated move done by OpenDNS before anyone could stop them. They deliberately opened a sort of Pandora's box. It's all about transparency and trust.
That was why, in my update to "version" in the opening post I changed it to read "DNSCrypt up to v0.0.6 (since May 2012)"
The thing is, OpenDNSCrypt apparently does exactly what it was designed to do - i.e., simply provide PC<-->OpenDNS node encryption
- so no further development would be needed unless (say) the encryption protocol, or something, needs to be changed for some reason.
My observation would be that it was a quite legitimate additional security service, effectively frustrating/preventing classic criminal "man-in-the middle" attacks, which would be an extremely inconvenient
service for any establishment-approved agencies undertaking surveillance/censorship at the user's ISP node
. Those agencies are effectively conducting "man-in-the middle" attacks and are also probably gathering "DNS leakage" data - both of which would be effectively blocked by OpenDNSCrypt.
The traffic that used
to flow between the user's PC and that ISP node was in clear and could be inspected
anywhere between the User's PC and that ISP node, whereas, if the user has now enabled OpenDNSCrypt, then now that traffic is encrypted
between the user's PC and the OpenDNS node.
Thus, it is now unintelligible encrypted traffic that flows through
the ISP node, and even if (say) one's Cisco ADSL modem/router had been compromised by these agencies, the now unintelligible encrypted traffic that flows through it to/from the PC would be of no use.
This would seem to force the point of surveillance/censorship to be moved to either inside
the OpenDNS node or on to the Cloud-side of the communication links from that node. So it "...would be an extremely inconvenient
service" for criminal organisations and/or establishment-approved agencies undertaking surveillance/censorship.
Bit of a bugger, that.