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Author Topic: refresher GOE post, sort of  (Read 7541 times)


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refresher GOE post, sort of
« on: August 21, 2008, 06:30:39 PM »
How to Become More Time Conscious

Everybody thinks they’re working hard-yet most people actually only use 60% or less of their available work time. In a Microsoft study done in 2005, more than 38,000 people in 200 countries were asked about their individual productivity. It turned out that though they were arriving at work five days a week, they were only usefully using three days.

nothing particularly new here but a good summary of GOE / GTD / GED / whatever :) with good observations about over/under-estimating time required to get things done
A sort of a refresher essay,
so ...
any comments about where you are now re "all this kind of thing" ?


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Reminds me of this paper, a horrible encouragement of micromanagement
« Reply #1 on: September 12, 2008, 07:31:34 PM »
Professor Jaag says that micromanagement and low pay is better than merit pay for measurable results.

Hidden Teacher Effort in Educational Production:
Monitoring vs. Merit Pay
Christian Jaag∗
February 25, 2005
This paper deals with the optimality of teacher incentive contracts in the presence of costly
or limited government resources. It considers educational production under asymmetric in-
formation as a function of teacher effort and class size. In the presence of costly government
resources and convex effort costs, teacher monitoring – which is wasteful in principle – may be
superior to merit pay in order to induce second-best teacher effort; optimum class size is not af-
fected by informational deficiencies. If the government budget is exogenously fixed, optimum
teacher effort may not be affordable, which is shown to make the case for monitoring activity
instead of incentive pay even stronger.
Keywords: Education, Moral Hazard, Monitoring,Merit Pay
JEL-Classification: I21, I28, D82