The imp thing about TC is 'plausible deniability'. Without this a harmful agent (such as the govt) would know that there is encrypted data and by law (or worse) force you to reveal the key. With a hidden container there is no trace that there is any data at all.
That's mostly true, and I do think that one of TC's outstanding features is how well thought out its plausible deniability is.
Not that I'm hiding any crimes, but...
I think that it's incorrect to say that the bad guy would not know that there is encrypted data. The DC container file must still exist; it's impossible to say what's in it, or indeed that it is encrypted data, with absolute certainty. But they don't need that kind of certainty, they just need the reasonable suspicion to issue a warrant that will force you to open it for them (or find you in contempt, and lead to deeper investigation, etc.)
The strong point of TC's plausible deniability is that a given container can have two separate keys, each of which reveals different content. You can have an outer shell that contains slightly embarrassing data, and give up that key when under duress. The bad guy, looking at the outer shell, has no way to know that there is another inner shell with the really juicy stuff, still buried in the container. But to be really plausible you need to mfill the outer shell with something that they'll believe that you were really trying to hide.